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Résumé Cet article propose un modèle de choix entrepeneurial mettant en évidence une 
relation non monotone entre le progrès technique et la sélection des entrepreneurs sur 
leurs capacités individuelles. Les choix de création d'entreprises sont examinés dans 
un modèle à deux périodes avec incertitude dans lequel les entrepreneurs décident de 
continuer ou abandonner leur projet en fonction de l'environnement technologique et 
de leurs compétences. On analyse comment le progrès technique modifie l'avantage 
comparatif des entrepreneurs et la dynamique de création d'entreprises dans 
l'économie. Au-delà d'un seuil de progrès technique,  un taux de progrès 
technologique rapide accroît l'efficacité des projets créés et réduit le nombre 
d'entrepreneurs qui choisissent de poursuivre, dans l'étape de développement, les 
projets les moins efficaces. Un progrès technique endogène, fondé sur un mécanisme 
d'apprentissage par la pratique, renforce ce résultat. Le progrès technique a tendance 
à exercer un effet "apurant" sur l'activité entrepreneuriale et modifie la perception du 
marché vis-à-vis de la création d'entreprises. 
 
Abstract This paper proposes a model of entrepreneurial activity highlighting a non-monotone 
relationship between technological change and ability-based sorting into 
entrepreneurial types. Entrepreneurial decisions are examined in a two-stage model 
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venture depending on technological change and on ability. This paper investigates 
how technological change affects the comparative advantage of entrepreneurs 
thereby shaping entrepreneurial dynamism. Under exogenous technological change, 
we show that above a threshold level, rapid technological progress increases the 
number of entrepreneurs undertaking the most efficient projects in the research stage 
and decreases the number of entrepreneurs of low-adaptative firms who choose to 
continue their initial business in the development stage. Technological change, 
endogenized in a learning-by-doing mechanism reinforces these results. Overall, a 
higher rate of technological change tends to induce a cleansing effect on 
entrepreneurial activity and alters the market perception of business creation. 
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This paper contributes to the debate on the determinants of entrepreneurial ac-
tivity by focusing on the complementarity between credit market conditions, techno-
logical environment and individual ability to run firms. For Lazear (2002) “entrepre-
neurs are jacks-of-all-trades who may not excel in any one skill, but are competent at
many”, suggesting that individuals with experience of many different roles are more
likely to become entrepreneurs. The obvious implication is that a less specialist and
more versatile education may help to spur the level of entrepreneurial activity1. Yet,
one may wonder why much more technology-intensive businesses are undertaken in
the US compared to Europe, even though these economies have comparable levels
of skills and human capital2.
Many arguments have been developed in the literature to explain differences
in entrepreneurship across countries: individual characteristics, institutional con-
straints (credit market frictions, administrative costs and barriers to entry), social
environment (market’s perception of failure), competition, technology and growth,
business cycles, information asymmetry, corporate governance, etc. In this paper,
we focus on the interaction between three main determinants of differences in entre-
preneurial activities: individual characteristics (ability), technical change and credit
market conditions. Considering that entrepreneurs are agents of change, their abil-
ity to respond to new opportunities is one of the principal determinants of how well
modern economies perform. In our analysis, an increase in the rate of technological
growth raises the relative return to entrepreneurial ability, and this affects the se-
lection of entrepreneurs by generating a concentration of high ability entrepreneurs
in the most efficient sectors. Consequently, the endogenous sorting of entrepreneurs
results in much poorer access to capital and at poorer terms for failed entrepreneurs.
From an entrepreneurship perspective, rapid technological growth can account for
an increase in inequality in start-up finance and different levels of entrepreneurial
activity across countries. By focusing on the interaction between individual ability,
technical change and credit market conditions to explain the creation of business en-
terprises, our approach leans upon two lines of arguments developed in the literature
on the determinants of entrepreneurial activity.
The first line of argument focuses on individual characteristics and ability and
mobilizes the literature on the links between entrepreneurship and human capital.
The attractiveness of entrepreneurial occupations to talent would depend on returns
to ability. According to Rosen’s (1981) “superstars”effect, the ablest individuals
choose occupations where having marginally greater talent leads to significantly
1The rate of entrepreneurial activity in 2001 indeed varies from 7.2% in Europe (4.5% in Bel-
gium, 7% in France, 7.5% in the UK, 12% in Ireland) to 12.2% in the US. Similarly, between 1995
and 2000, the annual average rate of new enterprise formation ranges from 6.5% in Denmark to
11.7% in France and 15.7% in Germany (European Commission, 2002).
2The labor force participation rates of individuals aged 25-64 with a tertiary level of education
in 1998 was 86.3% in OECD countries, 87.7% in the US and 87.3% in European economies (OECD
Employment Outlook, 1999). Similarly, the average annual employment growth of high-skilled
workers over the 1995-2001 period equals 2.79% both in the US and in Europe (OECD Labor force
statistics, July 2004)
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higher payoff and an economy stagnates if human capital is allocated improperly
for growth3. For Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny (1991), when productive entrepre-
neurship offers higher returns to ability than rent-seeking, which may stem from
complementary investments in human and physical capital, then the allocation of
talent will foster growth4. The differential allocation of talent in an economy, which
would be due to differences in returns to ability across sectors, may then explain
differences in entrepreneurship and growth between apparently similar countries.
But if the allocation of talent to entrepreneurship matters for growth, the reverse
relationship, i.e. the fact that growth affects the decision to become an entrepreneur,
is also subject to a large attention in the literature. As highlighted by Hassler and
Rodriguez-Mora (1999), the allocation of individuals over social positions (becoming
an entrepreneur or a worker) depends on the level of entrepreneurial difficulty driven
by the rate of technological growth. When the rate of technical change or growth is
high, the allocation of individuals over occupations depends more on innate ability
and less on social background and this fosters future growth. The latter effect relies
on a feedback mechanism whereby the entrepreneurs are the most able and talented
individuals in society and when they choose to become entrepreneurs they improve
the technology in the line of their business, which increases productivity, innovation
and growth. By increasing returns to productive entrepreneurship, ability-biased
technical change may thus explain differences in the creation of business enterprises
and growth. Following the literature on skill- or ability-biased technical change
(e.g. Galor and Tsiddon (1997), Galor and Moav (2000), Rubinstein and Tsiddon
(1999)), our model relies on this idea that technological change affects entrepreneur-
ial activity. However, our ambition remains different since we focus on the sorting
of individuals to different (“nascent”) entrepreneurial types rather than on occupa-
tional choices on the labor market. Moreover, we analyze the determinants of the
refinancing decision to determine whether growth induces selection and/or stigma-
tization regarding entrepreneurial decisions. More precisely, we propose a model in
which the endogenous sorting of individuals to entrepreneurial types depends both
on the complementarity between ability and growth and on credit market conditions
captured through banks’ interest rates.
The second line of argument explains the different levels of entrepreneurial activ-
ity according to differences in credit and labor market conditions5 (Rajan and Zin-
3In a seminal paper Lucas (1978) showed that individuals who have higher entrepreneurial pro-
ductivity start their own firms and both the economy’s output and individual profits are maximized
if more productive individuals organize production by others individuals, so that they can spear
their ability advantage over a larger scale. From an empirical perspective, Lazear (2002) observes
that MBAs with a more diverse curriculum are more inclined to become entrepreneurs.
4Baumol (1990) also shows that growth increases if society directs more entrepreneurial talent
to productive rather than to rent-seeking activities. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) highlight
more specifically the role of increasing returns to ability in explaining which activities the most
talented people choose.
5More generally, differences in institutional constraints such as taxes, labor market regulation,
administrative costs and barriers to entry significantly affect the level of entrepreneurship. Djankov
et al. (2002) show that the start-up process may take up to 66 days and 16 different legal and
4
gales (1998), and Bhattacharya and Chakraborty (2004)) or social norms (Landier
(2001), Gromb and Scharfstein (2001)). Acemoglu (2001) studies this effect on the
labor market and shows that a change in the pattern of comparative advantage af-
fects employment differently in economies with and without credit market frictions.
In his model, two economies, Europe and the US, which are identical except for
credit market frictions, will generate different responses to a common shock. The
US economy, which benefits from fewer credit market frictions than Europe, re-
sponds to the arrival of new technologies without an increase in unemployment. At
the opposite, technological change can have a persistent effect on European unem-
ployment because, in the absence of efficient credit markets, agents who need funds
for startups cannot borrow the necessary amount6. Finally, social interactions also
matter in the decision to become an entrepreneur because they create social norms
and affect reputation and tolerance toward failure. For example, career concerns can
induce inefficient continuation of investments as entrepreneurs may be reluctant to
abandon their initial project when this is perceived as recognizing an error was made
thereby generating an adverse signal for ability (Boot (1992), Holmstrom (1999)).
Similarly, entrepreneur’s failure may be highly stigmatized (implying a high cost of
capital after failure) or considered as part of the learning process, leading to different
types of entrepreneurial regimes and possibly too much or too little entrepreneur-
ship in equilibrium (Landier (2001), Gromb and Scharfstein (2001)). In our model,
the market’s perception of business failure (capital or labor market) matters but we
focus on a quite different aspect of entrepreneurship. While Gromb and Scharfstein
model entrepreneurship as a choice of an organizational form (entrepreneurship vs.
intrapreneurship), Landier focuses on capital markets for start-up finance (endoge-
nous -financial- stigmatization of failure). Here, we focus on the returns to ability
in entrepreneurship and endogenize the interactions between ability and technical
change. Entrepreneurial decisions are determined by the cost of capital but also
by the rate of technological progress. In particular, we characterize entrepreneurs
by their ability to implement a business strategy, which is defined as a two-stage
decision (research and development) under uncertainty: a research stage in which
the business idea is implemented, and a development stage in which the project is
fully developed and production takes place. The entrepreneurial decision is thus
determined by the impact of technological progress on returns to ability.
More precisely, we propose a model in which entrepreneurs differ in their ability
to implement business enterprises and the rate of technological progress complements
ability in the returns to entrepreneurial decisions. Two types of entrepreneurial
administrative steps in France while requiring 7 days and 4 steps in the United States. Protection
of creditors rights and the level of enforcement of law also matter because they affect the ability
of entrepreneurs to access start-up funds (Giannetti (2003)).
6In a different perspective, a growing literature considers the financing of new ventures through
venture capital and focuses on the mechanisms behind financing arrangements such as the allocation
of control rights and the staging of investments over time (Berglof (1994), Gompers (1995), Hellman
(1998)). Our model abstracts from the details of venture capital financing and uses a simple
contracting model to capture the interaction between ability, technical change and credit conditions
in the creation of business enterprises.
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projects may be chosen by individuals: a “high adaptative”(type H) project, suited
for entrepreneurs able to take correct decisions in rapidly changing environments,
and a “low adaptative”(type L) project, suited for lower levels of ability to run
efficiently projects in changing environments. Projects last for two stages, a research
stage and a development stage. The success of the research venture is determined
both by the entrepreneur’s ability and by the technological environment. After
initiating the project, the entrepreneur privately observes the probability of success
of the initial research venture. If the research stage is successfully completed a
product can be developed and sold on the market. Otherwise, if the probability of
success of the initial project is too low, the entrepreneur may decide to liquidate it
and ask for a refinancing to start a new research venture.
We show that growth affects the comparative advantage of entrepreneurs and
shapes the type of business creation. First, entrepreneurs of “high adaptative”firms
are better suited to an innovative environment: as the rate of technical change ac-
celerates the number of the most efficient firms increases as well. Second, growth
lowers the probability of success for entrepreneurs of “low adaptative”firms. The
interest rate charged to failed entrepreneurs willing to restart their initial business
is greater than the prevailing interest rates charged to first-timers. Finally, faster
growth reduces the number of entrepreneurs of “low adaptative”entrepreneurs who
choose to continue their initial business. Overall, rapid technological progress af-
fects sorting and induces a cleansing effect on business creation, thereby affecting
the stigmatization toward failure. This in turn may account for an increase in in-
equality in start-up financing of small and innovative firms and different levels of
entrepreneurial activity across countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the basic
set up. Section 2 describes the research and development stages. Section 3 examines
the equilibrium of the model and section 4 develops the main results with both
exogenous and endogenous technical change. Section 5 concludes the paper.
1 Basic set up
1.1 Overview
The model has three dates, t=0,1,2. All agents are risk neutral and the risk-free
interest rate is normalized to zero. There is no discounting. The economy is com-
posed of a continuum of entrepreneurs and investors. Projects last for two periods:
the first period is a research stage in which entrepreneurs implement their business
idea, the second period is a development stage in which production takes place.
At date 0, entrepreneurs are endowed with one research project each and lack any
source of finance. Bankers are endowed with plenty of funds but are short of research
ideas.
At date 1, after observing privately the business’s probability of success, entrepre-
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neurs decide to either continue the existing business or liquidate it and ask for a
refinancing to start a new one. Banks decide whether to grant a new loan to second
timers entrepreneurs and set interest rates. At the end of the second period, cash
flows and repayments are realized.
The sequence of events may be summarized as follows:
• t = 0:
Entrepreneurs ask for loans
Entrepreneurs choose between two types of business creation
Banks set interest rates
Business’s probability of success is private information to entrepreneurs
• t = 1:
Entrepreneurs choose whether to continue their initial business or liquidate it
and start a new one
Banks decide to refinance the entrepreneur or not
• t = 2: Cash flows and repayments are realized
1.2 Contractual variables
In the research stage, the decision to become an entrepreneur implies to choose
among two types of firms or projects: a “high-adaptative” (type H) or a “low-
adaptative” (type L) firm. In the type H firm, entrepreneurs can spread their ability
advantage in the sense that adaptativity to technological environment (and therefore
the firm’s returns) increases with individual ability. In type L firms, entrepreneurs
have to spend time learning and adapting to complexity. This learning process in-
creases the firm’s returns, but reduces available time for running it and therefore
decreases the probability of success of the business which is discovered at the end of
the research stage.
In the development stage, a final good is produced using two different types of in-
termediate goods: goods produced by continued firms (labelled j = c) and goods
produced by refinanced firms (labelled j = r). Hence, we denote the inputs in the
production of intermediate goods as “refinanced firms’ goods” and “continued firms’
goods”.
The financing contract between the entrepreneur and the investor, which is
signed at date 0, specifies an initial investment for the research venture of $1, gen-
erates a cash flow Vj and final repayment Rj at date 2 (j = c, r)
7.
Each entrepreneur can run only one business at a time. At date 1, after observing
7The financing contract can be interpreted as debt or equity. Under risk neutrality, a null
transfer in case of termination is not restrictive. Since the abandoned project has a zero reservation
value, whether the investor can seize it or not is irrelevant.
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privately the business’s probability of success, entrepreneurs choose whether to con-
tinue the initial business (j = c) or liquidate it and ask for a refinancing to start
a new business (j = r)8. In this case, the initial business is terminated and its
liquidation value is normalized to zero. The new business again requires an initial
investment of $1 and yields a cash flow of Vj at date 2. Hence, the new business
becomes a one-period project. Banks decide whether to grant a new loan to second
timers entrepreneurs at an interest rate of Rr.
If the business is abandoned or generates no cash flow at date 2, the repayment
to the bank is 0. We thus assume that the entrepreneur is liable for payments to the
lender only to the extent of current revenues. Therefore, the firm is restricted to a
nonnegative cash flow. Hence, we only need to characterize the repayment for the
first-timers (those who carry on the initial project until date 2) and second-timers
(entrepreneurs who abandon the first business and start again at date 1), Rc and
Rr. We assume that at date 0, the average project has a positive net present value
9.
The following figure reproduces the timing and the variables of the model. In
the research stage, if we denote by θ the firm’s type, θ = H,L, the expected value of
a firm, entrepreneurial payoffs and probabilities of success are denoted respectively
as V θ, λθ and piθ, θ = H,L. In the development stage, entrepreneurs choose to
continue the initial business or abandon it and ask for a refinancing to start a new
one. The firm’s expected values, entrepreneurial payoffs and probabilities of success
are denoted as V θc , λ
θ
c and pi
θ
c , θ = H,L, for continued businesses and as Vr, λr and
pir for refinanced businesses.
8At date 1, banks can distinguish between new entrants and failed entrepreneurs who are willing
to start a new business. We thus omit news entrepreneurs applying for a loan at the beginning of
the second period.
9Formally, see assumption 3 below .
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2 The research and development stages
2.1 The research stage
At date 0, there is a continuum of mass one of wealthless entrepreneurs who may
create “high-adaptative” (type H) or “low-adaptative” (type L) firms. The com-
plementarity between ability and technology in the individuals’ decision to become
entrepreneurs of type H or type L firms relies on the idea that basic skills become
rapidly obsolete in a rapidly changing environment. The most able individuals in-
deed have a comparative advantage in choosing to become an entrepreneur of type
H firms from too perspectives. On the one hand, having marginal greater ability is
rewarded in a type H firm, even in a stationary environment (where the rate of tech-
nological progress is constant) whereas learning and adapting to new environments
is rewarded in type L firms only when growth improves and provided that time is
spent to “absorb” new technologies. On the other hand, technological progress ex-
erts an erosion effect on the probability of success of a type L firm whereas it does
not affect that of a type H firm.
In other words, we propose a model of “nascent ”entrepreneurship (i.e. the entre-
preneurs who are currently taking explicit steps to start a new business) in which
individuals make the choice of creating a new venture and, as in Lazear’s view of
jack-of-all-trades, those who have sufficient knowledge in a variety of areas to put
together the many ingredients needed for survival and success in a business will
choose a type H firm, while those who have not these skills will choose to create a
type L firm in which they will not be able to spread their ability advantage10.
The firm’s expected value V θ depends on the ex ante continuation value Vc (in
case of refinancing) and on the entrepreneur’s adaptative capacity ρθ:
V θ = Vc · ρθ, θ = H,L
and the entrepreneur’s expected payoff is defined as:
piθ = λθ · V θ, θ = H,L
where λθ denotes the probability of success of the current business, which is
discovered privately by the entrepreneur after setting up the firm but before date 1.
Type H firms are run by entrepreneurs able to make difficult decisions in
complex environments. They adapt instantaneously to new environments and the
time needed to learn new technologies is null. Their adaptative capacity depends
10Our definition of nascent entrepreneurship focuses on the ability to adapt to a changing en-
vironment but a more complete theory would encompass more individual characteristics like for
example risk-aversion, previous employment status, regional characteristics or gender. Since we
focus on the interplay between ability, technical change and credit condition, we rely on a more
reduced-form to characterize entrepreneurship.
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only on their individual ability: ρH = h(ai) with 0 < h(ai) < 1, h
′(ai) > 0, and
where the entrepreneur’s ability ai is distributed uniformly over the unit interval
11.
A type H firm’s expected value is then defined as:
V H = Vc · h(ai)
In type H firms, the most able individuals have the highest adaptative capacity
whatever the rate of technological progress, the time needed to adapt to new tech-
nologies is null and the entrepreneur’s available time is entirely devoted to run the
firm. The probability of success of a type H firm is constant and defined by λH = λ,
where 0 < λ < 1. This assumption captures the idea that in type H firm, having
marginally greater ability is rewarding, and that others factors such as luck or the
technological environment do not affect the probability of success.
In type L firms, entrepreneurs do not have the same competence to take correct
decision in rapidly changing environments and learning is necessary to adapt to
the technological environment. We assume that the learning process involves an
opportunity cost such that the higher the rate of technological progress, the higher
the time spent learning the new environment, therefore the higher the adaptative
capacity of type L entrepreneurs, but the lower the time remaining for running
efficiently the project. We normalize entrepreneurs’ time to 1, so that in L type
firms, a fraction δ · γ of this time is devoted to adapt to new technologies and the
remaining fraction 1 − δγ is devoted to run the project. The parameter δ is thus
such that
Assumption 1. 0 < δγ < 1
The adaptative capacity of entrepreneurs running type L firms is proportional to
the rate of technological progress as follows: ρL = δ · γ. The firm’s expected value
then is defined as:
V L = Vc · δγ
In type L firms, entrepreneurs must spend time to learn and adapt to changing
environments and the marginal return to ability is null. The higher the time spent
learning, the higher the adaptativity, but the lower the time available for running
the firm (1 − δγ). In turn, the probability of success of type L firm is given by
λL = λ · (1− δγ). Hence, there is an erosion effect due to technological progress for
type L firms which affects the business’s probability of success.
We assume that the average project has a positive net present value:
Assumption 2. Project’s positive net present value: λ · (2− δγ) · V θ > 1
In sum, expected entrepreneurial payoffs are given by:
11Qualitative results are not affected by a more general distribution function for ability as long
as it is continuous.
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piL(ai) = λ · (1− δγ) · δγ · Vc (1)
piH(ai) = λ · h(ai) · Vc (2)
At date 0, given the above expected payoffs, entrepreneurs choose to engage in
a type H firm rather than in a type L firm if and only if, given their ability and
the rate of technological progress, the expected payoff from running a type H firm
is higher than the expected payoff from running a type L firm, that is:
piH(ai) ≥ piL(ai)⇐⇒ λ · h(ai) · Vc ≥ λ · (1− δγ) · δγ · Vc
Given that 0 < λ < 1 and 0 < δ · γ < 1, this inequality implies that there is
a unique threshold level of ability, a∗, such that 0 < a∗ < 1. All individuals with
ability above the threshold, a∗ choose to run type H firm, while all individuals with
ability below a∗ run type L firms: piH(a∗)) ≥ piL(a∗)), where:
a∗ = h−1(δγ(1− δγ)) (3)
Since the population mass is normalized to one and ability uniformly distributed
over the unit interval, the number of type L entrepreneurs is a∗ and the number
of type H entrepreneurs is 1 − a∗. Since function h(.) is continuous and strictly
increasing, the inverse function h−1 is also continuous and strictly increasing.
2.2 The development stage
At date 1, entrepreneurs choose whether to continue their initial business (j = c) or
liquidate it and start a new one (j = r). Banks decide to refinance the entrepreneur
or not.
We consider that the probability of success for refinanced firms is the same inde-
pendently of firms’ initial types. In other words, refinanced firms are closed down
and a new business starts. Hence, the entrepreneur generates the same level of out-
put whatever his ability. The probability that the business succeeds determines the
distribution of payoffs that are generated at date 2. At this date, conditional on
success, each entrepreneur running a firm of type θ will receive a net cash flow of
piθj = λ
θ
j · (Vj − Rj) where Rj and Vj represent the repayment to the bank and the
value of each type of business. If the business is abandoned or fails at date 2, no
repayments are made to the bank. The nonnegativity constraint on entrepreneur’s
cash flows requires the following assumption:
Assumption 3. Non-negative cash flows: Vj ≥ Rj, j = c, r
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The probabilities of success of each type of business enterprises are labelled λr
for a refinanced firm, λHc for a continuing firm of type H and λ
L
c for a continuing
firm of type L. We assume that λr = λ
L
c · κ, with κ ≤ 1. Hence we have:
λHc = λ > λ
L
c ≥ λr (4)
The expected payoff for each type of entrepreneur then writes:
piHc = λ
H
c · (Vc −Rc), piLc = λLc · (Vc −Rc), pir = λr · (Vr −Rr) (5)
with Rj and Vj the interest rates and the firms’ values. We assume that a
continued project has a positive net present value:
Assumption 4. Continued project’s positive net present value:
(λHc + λ
L
c )Vc > 1
After substituting for pic and pir from equations (19) and (20) in appendix (6.1),
entrepreneurial payoffs from running each type of firm are given by:
piHc = λ
H
c
1− α
α
· xc − λHc ·Rc (6)
piLc = λ
L
c
1− α
α
· xc − λLc ·Rc (7)
pir = λr
α
1− α · xr − λr ·Rr (8)
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Resources constraints
Firms differ in their type (H or L) and at date 1 and we can thus distinguish three
categories of firms: those that need a refinancing, firms of type L that are continued
and firms of type H that are continued. The population mass is normalized to one,
there is a proportion 1− a∗ of type H entrepreneurs. We denote by Hc (respectively
Lc) the fraction of entrepreneurs with type H (respectively type L) who continue
their business. Since the number of entrepreneurs is normalized to 1, the resources
constraints write:
nHc + n
L
c + nr ≡ 1 with

nHc = (1− a∗) ·Hc
nLc = a
∗ · Lc
nr = (1− a∗) · (1−Hc) + a∗ · (1− Lc)
(9)
where nHc (respectively n
L
c ) is the number of type H (respectively type L) firms
that are continued and nr is the number of firms that are refinanced.
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3.2 Refinancing decisions
We consider a first-time entrepreneur’s decision to continue or abandon his initial
business at date 1. An equilibrium is determined by the strategy (continuation or
abandon) of a first-time entrepreneur who observes the probability of success of his
current business and by the cost of capital, Rc and Rr for first-timers and second-
timers. Entrepreneurs of type L choose to continue their business as long as the
expected income, piLc , is higher than that of a refinanced firm, pir. In equilibrium,
this condition is binding, implying that the number of entrepreneurs of type L
who choose to continue their business satisfies the following indifference condition:
piLc = pir. Regarding entrepreneurs of type H, the assumption that λ
H
c > λ
L
c implies
that piHc > pi
L
c .
Refinancing decisions in turn satisfy the following rule:
piHc > pi
L
c = pir (10)
This rule implies that, all firms of type H choose to continue and firms of type
L are indifferent between continuing or refinancing, that is:
Hc = 1 (11)
piLc = pir⇐⇒λLc
1− α
α
· xc − λLc ·Rc = λr
α
1− α · xr − λr ·Rr (12)
Taking into account the resources constraints (9), the market clearing condition
writes:
xc = λ
H
c n
H
c + λ
L
c n
L
c , xr = λrnr (13)
Substituting for (13) into (12) finally allows determining the number Lc of firms
of type L that choose to continue:
⇔ Lc =
α
1−ακ
2 + a
∗−1
a∗
1
1−δγ
1−α
α
+ Rc−κRr
λ(1−δγ)a∗
α
1−ακ
2 + 1−α
α
(14)
3.3 Banks’ decision
Banks maximize their profits and offer interest rates to first-timer entrepreneurs
(those who carry on the initial project until date 2) and to second-timers (the ones
who ask for a refinancing at date 1). The loan contract is parameterized by Rc
for the entrepreneurs who continue their initial project and by Rr for those who
want to start again an investment project. At the beginning of the first period, if
the loan contract specifies a promised repayment such that lenders get an expected
return at least equal to the amount of the initial loan, $1, the loans are granted.
If banks receive repayment lower than the initial loan, they refuse to finance the
entrepreneur’s investment project. Banks set an identical single rate for both types
14
since they can not distinguish between the two types of entrepreneurs at a time
when the loan is granted.
The loan contract involves liquidation for all payment lower than the face value
of the debt, Rc and Rr. Since liquidation destroys all profits from a project, in-
cluding the entrepreneur’s repayment, both lenders and borrowers receive zero pay-
ments whenever there is liquidation. This implies that entrepreneurs will honor
their obligation of repayment whenever their projects deliver sufficient return and
in equilibrium, there is liquidation only when the value of the project’s cash flow is
zero. Entrepreneurs behave as price takers, that is, they can not affect the interest
rates charged by the bank. They always borrow from the competing bank offering
the lowest interest rate.
We have shown that all firms of type H continue rather than refinance. In
addition, the number of firms of type L that choose to continue (Lc) is given by
equation (14). In that case, the number of type L firms which ask for a refinancing
is given by: a∗(1−Lc). In comparison, the number of entrepreneurs who continue is
given by (1− a∗) ·Hc+ a∗ ·Lc. We now have to determine equilibrium interest rates
charged by the bank in period 2.
For a second-timer, in a competitive financial market the bank’s break-even rate
satisfies:
Rr =
1
λr
(15)
where λr is the probability of success for a type L second timer, so that the
entrepreneur can meet his obligation of repayment toward the bank.
At the first period, banks charge an interest rate Rc prevailing for first-timers.
The bank’s break-even rate for a loan made to a randomly selected entrepreneur at
the first period insures that the unconditional probability of success λHc +λ
L
c equals
the initial investment. Solving for Rc yields:
Rc =
1
λHc + λ
L
c
(16)
Note that Rc < Vc from assumption 4. From equation (4) we get λ
H
c > λ
L
c ≥ λr.
In turn we have Rc < Rr, which implies that the interest rates charged for a failed
entrepreneur who restarts a project is greater than the prevailing interest rates for
a first timer entrepreneur.
The incentive compatibility constraint ensuring that type L firms with a low
probability of success choose to continue is:
a∗LcλLc (Vc −Rc) > a∗(1− Lc)λr(Vr −Rr)
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In equilibrium, second-time entrepreneurs can refinance their business only if,
Rr < Vr. Otherwise, no feasible payment allows the creditor to break even. If,
Rr > Vr, entrepreneurs willing to start again their business are unable to refinance.
Consequently, the incentive compatible constraint can be rewritten as: a∗LcλLc (Vc−
Rc) > 0, which holds from assumption 4. Hence, the market does not refinance failed
businesses. This situation arises when the expected value of the initial business for
failed entrepreneurs is negative, i.e., λLc · Vc < 1.
Without altering the qualitative result of the model but to simplify exposition
we will consider for the rest of the paper that h(ai) = ai, that is:
a∗ = h−1(δγ(1− δγ)) = δγ(1− δγ) (17)
Definition 1. Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this economy is characterized by equations (3), (9), (11), (14),
(15) and (16) defining the values of a∗, nHc , n
L
c , nr, Hc, Lc, Rcand Rr, that is:
1. At date 0, all individuals with ability below a∗ run type L firms, with:
a∗ = δγ(1− δγ)
2. At date 1, the number of firms of type L that choose to continue is given by:
Lc =
α
1−ακ
2 − 1−a∗
a∗
1
1−δγ
1−α
α
+ Rc−κRr
λ(1−δγ)a∗
α
1−ακ
2 + 1−α
α
3. The interest rate charged to continued businesses is given by:
Rc =
1
(λHc + λ
L
c )
=
1
λ(2− δγ)
4. The interest rate charged to refinanced businesses is given by:
Rr =
1
λr
=
1
λκ(1− δγ)
Lemma 1: A continuation equilibrium exists if:
a∗LcλLc (Vc −Rc) > a∗(1− Lc)λr(Vr −Rr)
If Rr > Vr, entrepreneurs willing to start a new business at date 1, are not refi-
nanced.
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4 The cleansing effect of growth and the selection
of business enterprises
4.1 Exogenous technological change
We derive in this section the analytical results of our model with exogenous tech-
nological change, which are illustrated with numerical simulations reproduced in
appendix 6.2.
Proposition 1. Growth and firms’ types.
Faster growth, in the sense of a higher rate of technical change increases (respectively
decreases) the number of entrepreneurs that choose to run type H firms when γ >
γ˜ = 1/2δ (respectively γ < γ˜ = 1/2δ).
Proof: see appendix 6.2. 
Proposition 1 states that above a threshold level, as the rate of technological progress
γ increases, the number of entrepreneurs running a type H firm 1− a∗ increases as
well. This phenomenon can thus be interpreted as follows. A faster technical change
induces a selection effect on the number of type H projects that are undertaken in
the first period. Type H firms are considered as high-adaptative because they are
run by entrepreneurs able to take the correct decision in difficult situations. As the
rate of technological change accelerates, this confers a comparative advantage to
entrepreneurs running a type H firm compared to those running a type L firm.
This proposition captures the stylized fact that a change in technology affects
which agents have a comparative advantage in entrepreneurship and this in turn
affects business creation. Assuming that innovative activities are more likely to
be undertaken by type H entrepreneurs, the view that technological progress fa-
vor skilled agents is supported by a considerable literature on skill-biased technical
change (see e.g. the survey by Acemoglu (2001)). In Acemoglu (1998), an exoge-
nous increase in the supply of skills makes skill-biased techniques more profitable and
firms have greater incentives to develop and adopt such techniques. In our model,
rapid technological progress increases the comparative advantage of the most able
entrepreneurs to run firms and endogenously raises the number of type H firms.
Proposition 2. Growth, interest rates and composition effects
The interest rates charged to failed entrepreneurs who restart their initial business,
Rr is greater than the prevailing interest rates for first timer entrepreneurs, Rc. Both
interest rates are increasing in the rate of technical change.
Proof: Rr > Rc is obtained using equations (4) and (9). The derivative of Rr and
Rc with respect to γ is immediate (see appendix 6.2 for details). 
Note first that both interest rates, Rr and Rc, are increasing with the rate of
technical change. This highlights the complementary role between entrepreneurs’
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ability and the rate of technological progress. As suggested above by equations (1)
and (2), faster technological change increases the relative return to ability for type
H firms compared to type L firms. This in turn translates into a lower probability of
success for type L entrepreneurs (due to the erosion effect that affects the business’s
probability of success), and for refinanced firms which exerts an upward pressure
on corresponding interest rates. Hence, faster growth exerts an erosion effect on
entrepreneurs’ ability to run correctly type L or refinanced firms, and interest rates
adjust upward12.
Proposition 2 also states that the interest rate charged to first timer entrepre-
neurs is lower than the interest rate charged to second timer entrepreneurs. This
suggests that the cost of capital rises when the credit history of an entrepreneur
includes a failure to honor its debt obligation toward the creditor. Because of the
uncertainty about the borrower’s type, lenders will downgrade their beliefs about the
borrower’s quality when default occurs and will upgrade their beliefs when payment
was made the previous periods. High-quality borrowers therefore expect to receive
lower cost of capital than low-quality borrowers. The latter in contrast are more
likely to have their credit rationed or to be excluded from the credit market (Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981)). For many inexperienced entrepreneurs, building up a good credit
history through hard work and conservative investing is crucial as borrowers with
unfavorable credit histories (e.g. past bankruptcies and delinquent payments) typ-
ically have poorer access to credit and at poorer terms. Bankruptcy in particular
has harsh consequences since it normally involves a temporary ban from borrowing
and a relatively higher cost of capital afterwards (Vercammen (1995)).
The above observations also reflect the fact that firms which have only recently
started their business have short credit history and thus have lower credit ratings
than firms which have been trading for a long time. As a result, the latter benefit
from lower cost of capital compared to the former. Furthermore, in the event of an
aggregate shock, evidence suggest that an established firm with a good track record
is less likely to have its credit rating downgraded than a recent start-up, without an
established credit record (Japelli and Pagano (2000)). This also suggests that rep-
utation effects play a crucial role in providing entrepreneurs incentives to perform.
Diamond (1989) illustrates that reputation effects in credit markets strengthen over
time. In his model, high-risk borrowers are gradually excluded from the credit mar-
ket as their types become revealed to lenders. Hence, the increasing concentration
of low-risk borrowers results in a decline in the average cost of capital, and this
induces some borrowers to switch from choosing a high-risk to a low-risk project13.
12In Galor and Moav (2000), ability-biased technical change modifies the comparative advantage
of high-skilled workers and raises inequality both between and within groups. Here, we highlight
a different channel through which ability-biased technical change may affect business creation,
namely the cost of capital.
13Yet, Holmstrom (1982) examines reputation effects in labour market and argues that
reputation-related incentives statedly decline as information about the manager’s type is revealed
over time.
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Proposition 3. Selection and the cleansing effect of growth
Faster growth, in the sense of a higher rate of technological change, reduces the
number of entrepreneurs of type L that choose to continue their initial business
when γ > γ˜ = 1/2δ.
Proof: see appendix 6.2. 
Proposition 3 suggests that growth has an ambiguous impact on the number of
entrepreneurs of type L that choose to continue their initial business. This impact
depends on the opportunity cost of running a type H firm rather than a type L firm
in the initial phase of the investment decision. This opportunity cost is related to
the marginal effects of both learning and erosion of productivity due to technolog-
ical progress and affects the business climate toward failure. More specifically, let
γ˜ = 1/2δ be the threshold value above which the number of type H firm increases.
Similarly, below this threshold the number of type H firm decreases with the growth
rate.
When the rate of technical change is greater than the threshold, level γ > γ˜, a
higher rate of technical change γ results in lower probabilities of success for type
L entrepreneurs. Hence, the number of entrepreneurs running a type L firm a∗
decreases with growth. This translates into a lower number of low-adaptative firms
that are continued and a high rate of firm destruction.14 Also, there is a high
concentration of type H entrepreneurs who continue their initial business (from (11)
we have Hc = 1). Overall, in this economy the average value of businesses and the
pool of entrepreneurs are of high quality. In other words, growth induces a cleansing
effect on entrepreneurial activity which translates into a climate of tolerance toward
failure15. When business failure is weakly stigmatized, terminating a project does
not damage entrepreneurs’ reputation such that they abandon more easily a project
with poor future prospects.
A large body of evidence suggests that failure is highly stigmatized in Europe
and in some Asian countries, whereas the American’s entrepreneurial regime con-
siders failure as a valuable entrepreneur’s learning experience (Landier (2001), and
Saxenian (1994)). In particular, the share of nascent entrepreneurs is equal to 8.3%
in the US, 3.4% in Germany and the UK and 0.9% in France, and only 23% of the
failed entrepreneurs are nascent entrepreneurs today in Germany (Wagner, 2004).
The fear of failure would actually prevent more than 35% of Europeans from starting
a new business (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2002). In the US entrepreneur-
ial regime, new firms have an innovative advantage and therefore undertake risky
projects which leads to a high mortality rate. In contrast, in the European regime,
innovation is undertaken by large established firms and new firms have a higher
14In the simulations (6.3), for all negative values the optimal decision is simply Lc = 0. This
illustrates the fact that no low-adaptative firms are continued when entrepreneurs receive bad news
about the firm’s future prospects.
15Note that for γ < 1/2δ, we do not have a simple analytical result and this case is only illustrated
graphically with numerical simulations, which are reproduced in appendix 6.3.
19
survival rate. Winter (1984), and Audretsch (1995) provide empirical evidence on
the rate of creation and destruction of firms in Europe and US. They show that
even though much fewer firms are created in Europe, the proportion of small firms
among existing firms is much higher in Europe than in the US. The OECD Small
and Medium Enterprise outlook reports that in the late 1990s, 31.7 % (respectively
29.5 %) of French employees worked in an enterprise of less than 20 employees
(respectively 500), versus 19.5 % (respectively 47.5 %) for the American employees.
In summary, growth has a non-monotone effect on the creation and destruction
of businesses depending on the threshold γ˜ = 1/2δ. When γ > γ˜ faster growth by
modifying the comparative advantage of entrepreneurs’ types induces entrepreneurs
to take the correct decision regarding the continuation or liquidation of their initial
business. Rapid technological growth affects sorting and thus participates in filtering
out the least efficient types of entrepreneurs. This effect translates into a lower
number of entrepreneurs of low-adaptative firms who choose to continue their initial
business.
4.2 Endogenous technological change
In this section we endogenize the rate of technological change to analyze the feedback
mechanism from the allocation of entrepreneurial talents to innovation and growth.
As before, there are two periods (or stages): entrepreneurs develop their business
idea in the research stage and production occurs in the development stage. The
final good sector and the intermediate goods sector are described in appendix 6.1.
We now assume that the rate of technological progress is a positive linear function
of the number of type H entrepreneurs who pursue their business idea over both
stages: γ = ε · λHc nHc with ε > 0. This assumption captures the idea of learning-by-
doing: as entrepreneurs of type H are the most able to adapt and spread their ability
advantage, they contribute to increasing knowledge and growth in the economy.
Given the equilibrium values obtained in section 3, we can substitute for the
values of λHc and n
H
c to get the following endogenous growth rate:
γ = ελ(1− δγ + δ2γ2)
The existence of a positive equilibrium rate of technological progress requires a
further restriction on the value of the parameter ε:
Assumption 5.
ε < ε˜ ≡ 1
λ(1− δ + δ2)
Proposition 4. Endogenous technological progress
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Under Assumption 1 and 4, there exists a unique equilibrium rate of technological
progress γ̂ ∈ (0, 1). The equilibrium rate of technological change increases with the
probability of success of the business project (λ) and the spillover rate of learning-
by-doing (ε) and decreases with the adaptative capacity of entrepreneurs of type L
(δ).
Proof: see appendix 6.4 
We consider an endogenous rate of technological change which takes the form
of a learning-by-doing mechanism proportional to the fraction of type H entrepre-
neurs. We find that a higher spillover rate of learning-by-doing (i.e. an increase in
its efficiency) improves the rate of technological progress. Similarly, a rise in the
projects’ probability of success increases the rate of technical change directly by
improving the learning curve (i.e. the learning externality). Interestingly, the rise
in λ also affects the composition of the pool of entrepreneurs in the first period by
reducing the threshold of ability a? above which individuals choose to run type H
projects. This mechanism reinforces the feedback loop by which technical change
tends to generate discipline: a rise in λ, though affecting apparently similarly all
types of projects, tends to reduce the number of entrepreneurs of type L that choose
to continue.
Moreover, we find that the rate of technical change decreases when the spillover
rate of learning-by-doing ε goes down, which occurs for instance due to knowledge
obsolescence. Through its negative impact on the rate of technological progress,
knowledge obsolescence hence negatively affects the comparative advantage of type
H entrepreneurs. This leads to a higher stigma of failure and thereby a higher
number of entrepreneurs of type L who choose to continue their initial business.
Finally, the higher the marginal adaptativity cost of type L entrepreneurs δ, the
lower the rate of technical progress. A higher value of δ increases both the adap-
tative capacity of type L firms and the erosion effect on the probability of success.
Overall, the erosion effect dominates and an increase in δ affects business creation
by improving the comparative advantage of type H entrepreneurs and reducing the
number of entrepreneurs of type L firms who choose to continue their business.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the determinants of entrepreneurial activity by focusing on the
complementarity between credit market conditions, technological environment and
individual ability to run firms. We develop a two-stage project development set
up. We show that rapid technological change affects sorting. First, an acceleration
in the growth rate modifies the comparative advantage of individuals in running
high versus low-adaptative firms. Above (below) a threshold level, the number of
entrepreneurs who choose to run the most efficient projects increases (decreases)
21
with the growth rate. Second, a higher rate of technical change results in lower
probabilities of success for type L entrepreneurs, and this in turn justifies a high cost
of capital for undertaking a new venture. Lastly, above the threshold level, faster
growth reduces the number of entrepreneurs of low-adaptative firms who choose
to continue their initial business. This cleansing effect on entrepreneurial activity
highlights that higher levels of growth may reduce stigmatization of failure. When
failure is considered as part of the learning process, entrepreneurs abandon more
easily an inefficient project. Moreover, an endogenous rate of technological change
reinforces the mechanism through which the allocation of entrepreneurial talents
affects entrepreneurial dynamism.
The fact that rapid technological progress can account for an increase in in-
equality across countries is supported by numerous studies. The conventional view
is that innovation stimulates job creation but induces simultaneously the destruction
of other (older) jobs. Too little entrepreneurial activity can then result from a lack of
innovation and hence of job creation (Aghion and Howitt (1992), and Mortensen and
Pissarides (1998)). The way the growth rate affects entrepreneurs’ ability thereby
influencing entrepreneurial dynamism is the central theme of this paper. We show
that when the rate of technological progress is high, the return to entrepreneurs’
ability increases. This in turn affects entrepreneurial sorting in a way that either
boosts or hinders entrepreneurship. As an example, the entrepreneurial dynamism
of the US economy is in sharp contrast to the relatively low level of firm creation
in Europe. A survey on entrepreneurship conducted in 2002 reports that while an
estimated 10% of a representative sample of the US stated that they were currently
engaged in the process of creating a nascent business, this figure is below 2% for
Japan and France, and below 4% for most European countries. We thus mention
that the complementarity between technical change and ability in the decision to
create a business venture may influence the nature of nascent entrepreneurship in an
economy. Our model focuses on a specific characteristics of nascent entrepreneur-
ship based on adaptability to a changing environment. Several extensions could be
considered to enlarge this analysis. In particular, introducing other factors such as
competition between firms could yield insightful results and constitutes an area for
our future research.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Description of the development stage
In the development stage, we consider an economy composed of two sectors: a final
good sector and an intermediate goods sector. Intermediate goods are used as factors
of production in the final good sector. The final good is produced using two different
types of intermediate goods: The goods produced by continued firms (labelled c)
and the goods produced by refinanced firms (labelled r).
The production function is a Cobb-Douglas:
y = xαc x
1−α
r (18)
where y is the final good production in a competitive environment using both
continued firms’ goods, xc, and refinanced firms’ goods, xr, and where 0 < α < 1.
The profit maximization problem by a representative firm in this sector leads to
the following inverse demand for inputs:
pc =
∂y
∂xc
= αxα−1c x
1−α
r (19)
pr =
∂Y
∂xr
= (1− α)xαc x−αr (20)
where pc denotes the price of continued firms’ goods and pr the price of refinanced
firms’ goods. Consequently, the equilibrium price of each intermediate good, xc and
xr is given by its marginal product.
Intermediate goods are used to produce the final good according to a one-for-one
technology. In particular, it is assumed that x units of final good requires x units of
intermediate goods. Given the inverse demand for intermediate goods in the final
good sector (19) and (20), the optimization program for continued firms, c and for
refinanced firms, r is given by:
max
xc
pcxc − xc = αxαc x1−αr − xc.
max
xr
prxr − xr = (1− α)xαc x1−αr − xr.
from where we obtain the profit-maximizing prices and the flow of profits for
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each type of business:
pc =
1
α
, pr =
1
1− α (21)
Vc =
1− α
α
· xc, Vr = α
1− α · xr
6.2 Proofs
6.2.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is made for a general set of functions h(.), in particular when h(x)=x as
in (3).
Note that function h(.) is continuous and strictly increasing. Then, the inverse
function, h−1 is also continuous and strictly increasing. From equation (3) we get
∂a∗
∂γ
= h−1
′
(δγ(1− δγ)) · δ(1− 2δγ)
where h−1
′
(.) > 0.
Given that the number of entrepreneurs that choose to run type H firms is equal
to 1− a∗, we have
∂H
∂γ
> 0⇔ (1− 2δγ) < 0
6.2.2 Proof of Proposition 2
(i) After simple manipulation, the interest rates defined by equations (15) and (16)
write:
Rr =
1
λκ(1− δγ)
Rc =
1
λ(2− δγ)
After some simple algebra we have
Rr −Rc = 1− δγ + 1− κ(1− δγ))
λκ(1− δγ)(2− δγ)
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We thus get Rc < Rr, which implies that the interest rates charged to a failed
entrepreneur who restarts his project is greater than the prevailing interest rates for
a first timer entrepreneur.
(ii) The derivative of Rr and Rc with respect to γ is immediate from equations
(15) and (16): both interest rates are increasing in the rate of technical change.
6.2.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Substituting for (15) and (16) into (14) and rewriting yields :
Lc = Λ · {Φ−Ψ(a∗(γ), γ)− Ω(a∗(γ), γ)}
where given (17)
a∗(γ) = δγ(1− δγ)
Λ =
1
α
1−ακ
2 + 1−α
α
Φ =
α
1− ακ
2
Ψ(a∗(γ), γ) =
1− a∗(γ)
a∗(γ)
1
1− δγ
1− α
α
Ω(a∗(γ), γ) = − Rc − κRr
λ(1− δγ)a∗(γ) =
1
λ2(1− δγ)2(2− δγ)a∗(γ)
Deriving with respect to γ then gives:
(Lc)
′ =
∂Lc
∂γ
= Λ{−(Ψ)′ − (Ω)′}
(Ψ)′ =
∂Ψ(a∗(γ), γ)
∂γ
=
1− α
α
−(a∗)′
(a∗)2
1
1− δγ +
1− α
α
1− a∗
a∗
δ
(1− δγ)2
(Ω)′ =
∂Ω(a∗(γ), γ)
∂γ
=
−(a∗)′(1− δγ)(2− δγ) + a∗δ(1− δγ) + 2a∗δ(2− δγ)
λ2(a∗)2(1− δγ)3(2− δγ)2
(a∗)′ =
∂a∗(γ)
∂γ
= δ(1− 2δγ)
¿From these equations, we can state that whenever (a∗)′ < 0, then (Lc)′ < 0.
In other words, when γ > 1/2δ, Lc decreases with the growth rate γ. The opposite
case where γ < 1/2δ does not yield a simple analytical result and is only illustrated
graphically with numerical simulations, reproduced in appendix 6.3.
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6.3 Numerical simulations with exogenous technical change
To run the numerical simulations, the parameters values are then given as follows:
α = 0.97, δ = 5, λ = 0.9, κ = 1. The following figures illustrate the links we
established between the different variables explored in this paper. They also serve
as an illustration of the propositions stated above.
We then get the following curves corresponding to the different effects highlighted
in propositions 1 to 3. Figure A and B draw aast andH as functions of γ. We observe
that aast is a inverted-U shaped curve and H is a U-shaped curve. Regarding figure
C, plotting Lc: when γ > γ˜ = 1/2δ = 0.10, Lc decreases with the growth rate. On
the other hand, when γ < γ˜ = 1/2δ = 0.10, Lc first increases (stigmatization is high)
and as γ gets closer to the threshold value γ˜, it starts decreasing (stigmatization
starts decreasing).
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6.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The rate of technological progress is governed by the equation γ = ελ(1−δγ+δ2γ2).
Let analyze the function φ(γ) = γ − ελ(1− δγ + δ2γ2).
We have:
φ(0) = −ελ < 0, φ(1) = 1− ελ(1− δ + δ2)
φ
′
(γ) = 1 + ελδ − 2δ2ελγ, φ′(0) = 1 + ελδ > 0
φ
′′
(γ) = − 2ελδ2 < 0
Under assumption 4, ε < 1
λ(1−δ+δ2) , we get: φ(1) = 1 − ελ(1 − δ + δ2) > 0.
Furthermore,
ελ <
1
1− δ + δ2 =
1
(1− δ)2 + δ <
1
δ
and
ελ <
1
δ
⇒ 1 + 1
ελδ
> 2
Finally, under assumption 1, 0 < δγ < 1⇒ 2δγ < 2, we therefore get
2δγ < 2 < 1 +
1
ελδ
⇒ 1 + ελδ − 2δ2ελδ > 0⇔ φ′(γ) > 0
In sum, we have shown that under assumption 1 and 4, the equation governing
the rate of technological progress φ(γ) = γ − ελ(1− δγ + δ2γ2) is such that:
φ(0) < 0, φ(1) > 0, φ
′
(γ) > 0, φ
′
(0) > 0, φ
′′
(γ) < 0
Hence, the rate of technical change γ̂ that solves φ(γ) = 0 exists, is unique and
such that γ̂ ∈ (0, 1).
To illustrate the static comparative of γ̂ with respect to the parameters of the
model, some numerical simulations are reported below. The parameters values are
then given as follows: α = 0.97, δ = 5, κ = 1. The variable ε˜ corresponds to the
threshold level defined in assumption 5: ε < ε˜ ≡ 1
λ(1−δ+δ2)
Table I: Rates of technological change for different values of λ, δ and ε
δ λ ε˜ ε γ
2 0.9 0.37 0.3 0.204
5 0.9 0.053 0.03 0.024
20 0.9 0.003 0.029 0.0025
5 0.9 0.053 0.05 0.038
5 0.8 0.059 0.05 0.034
5 0.8 0.059 0.03 0.021
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